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IN SUPPORT OF A MANDATORY PRO BONO RULE
FOR NEW YORK STATE
INTRODUCTION
Sparked by a growing concern for the unmet need of the
indigent for civil legal services, New York State's judiciary is
considering the feasibility of adopting a mandatory pro bono
rule for all New York State attorneys.1 According to several
studies across the nation, only fifteen to twenty percent of the
civil legal service needs of the poor are met.2 As the population
of poor people increases, the problem only worsens. 3 Cuts in
funding for the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) have further
exacerbated the situation.4
I Morocco, Around the ABA, 76 A.BA J. 92 (July 1990) (In his keynote addres at
the 1990 ABA Pro Bono Conference, New York State Court of Appeals Chief Judge Sol
Wachtler said that New York attorneys will face a mandatory pro bono requirement if
the amount of pro bono work they provide does not increase by 1992.).
" Lardent, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: The Wrong Answer to the Right
Question, 49 MD. L. Ray. 75, 86 n.22 (1990) (citing Civil Legal Service3 Comm'n, North
Dakota Supreme Court, North Dakota Trial Lawyers' Ass'n, A Workable Plan for Civil
Legal Services for the Poorn A Practical, Equitable and Political Proposal for Bar Lead.
ership (1988); Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal Services, Preliminary Re-
port to the Chief Judge of the State of New York (1989); Spangenberg Group Report, In
Two Nationwide Surveys: 1989 Pilot Assessments of the Unmet Legal Needs of the Poor
and of the Public Generally (Sept. 1989)).
1 Carroll, Current Professional Issues: Addressing Obligations and Exploring Op-
portunities, 62 N.Y. ST. BJ. 8, 9 (Feb. 1990).
' Id. See also Vigdor, Pro Bono Service: Mandatory or Voluntary?, 62 N.Y. ST. BJ.
32, 33 (May 1990) ("Despite efforts of the (ABA] and most state and local bar associa-
tions, the Legal Services Corporation has been grossly underfunded for the last 10 years
and is annually $225 million behind where it was 10 years ago-despite the significant
increase in the poverty population during that period."); Wechsler, Attorneys' Attitudes
Toward Mandatory Pro Bono, 41 SYRAcusE L. R.Ev. 909, 916-17 (1990) (referring to cuts
to the LSC program during the Reagan and Bush Administrations); liskiewicz,
Mandatory Pro Bono Won't Disappear, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 23, 1987, at 1, col. 3. The 257
cut in funding for LSC in 1980 has never been fully restored. From 1984-86, federal
funding was frozen at $305.5 million, $15 million less than before 1980. In 1987, as a
result of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget reduction act, an additional reduction of
$14.3 million was made. Although the LSC continues to "close as many cases" as before
the funding cuts, it is not known how many cases are being turned away. The Project
Advisory Group, which lobbies for more funding for the LSC, advises that there are now
1.6 attorneys for every 10,000 people living below the federal poverty line. Additional
funding of $170-175 million would be needed to restore the pre-1980 level of 2 attorneys
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In 1987, the New York State Bar Association (NYSBA)
commissioned a study on the legal needs of the poor.8 The New
York Legal Needs Study (Legal Needs Study) found that in
New York State only fourteen percent of the civil legal service
needs of the poor are provided.6 The Legal Needs Study re-
ported an average of more than two legal problems per house-
hold faced without legal assistance.7 Based on a poor population
of more than 1.2 million, the Legal Needs Study estimated that
seven hundred thousand households, or fifty-seven percent of all
low-income households, face over three million civil legal
problems each year without legal assistance.' The most fre-
quently reported legal problems were in the categories of hous-
ing, public benefits, consumer issues and health.'
Following the Legal Needs Study, two plans were put forth
by the legal community in New York to increase the poor's ac-
cess to the legal system. The first plan was submitted by a com-
mittee appointed by Chief Judge Sol Wachtler in April 1988 (the
Marrero Committee) to study the availability of legal services
and to make recommendations for improvements.1" The plan in-
per 10,000 people. Id. For a description of LSC, see Note, Mandatory Pro Bono: The
Path to Equal Justice, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 355, 356 n.10 (1989).
' The study was conducted by the Spangenberg Group, based in West Newton,
Massachusetts. The Draft Final Report was submitted to the NYSBA on Oct. 11, 1989.
' Spangenberg Group, New York Legal Needs Study 196 (Oct. 11, 1989) (Draft Final
Report) [hereinafter Legal Needs Study] (available from NYSBA and on file at the
Brooklyn Law School Library). Attorneys' pro bono contributions made outside of organ.
ized bar pro bono programs are not adequately measured for New York, and the Legal
Needs Study estimated those contributions using figures from other studies. Id. at 194-
95, 197.
7 Id. at 20. The Legal Needs Study reported an average of 2.37 noncriminal legal
problems handled without legal assistance per household, including those households
that had legal assistance. Of those households that had experienced one or more legal
problems without legal assistance, the average was 4.18 legal problems per household. Id.
* Id. at 24. Population figures were based on the 1980 U.S. Census Bureau statistics.
9 Id. at 24, 203. The Legal Needs Study categorized the areas where the poor need
legal assistance as follows, in descending order of frequency: housing, public benefits,
consumer, health, utility, discrimination, employment, school, family, other, and immi.
gration. Id. at 25. Immigration problems may have been underreported by interviewees
due to fear of disclosure. Id. at 26.
10 Serving on the Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal Services (the Mar-
rero Committee) were: Victor Marrero, Chair; Bradley Backus; Hanna S. Cohn; Sol Neil
Corbin; Louis A. Craco; Evan A. Davis; Charles H. Dougherty; Herbert B. Evans; Robert
B. Fiske, Jr.; Alexander D. Forger; Ellen V. Futter; Thomas F. Gleason; Raymond W.
Hackbarth; Sandra W. Jacobson; Robert M. Kaufman; Joseph T. McLaughlin; Gerald A.
Norlander; John K. Powers; Norman Redlich; Hon. Israel Rubin; Cyrus R. Vance; and
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cluded a mandatory pro bono requirement for all registered at-
torneys actively practicing law in New York State."" This propo-
sal for a mandatory rule generated a strong reaction from the
legal community.12 At best, a mandatory plan was viewed by op-
ponents as an "absolute last resort," on the ground that volun-
tary pro bono programs were still relatively young, and it was
too soon to impose a mandatory rule.13 A special committee of
the NYSBA, organized in response to the mandatory require-
ment proposal, put forth an alternate plan, proposing that the
pro bono obligation remain a voluntary one and adopting a min-
imum pro bono standard as an aspirational guideline for all at-
torneys in New York State.1 4
On May 1, 1990, Chief Judge Wachtler announced he would
delay promulgating a mandatory pro bono rule for two years to
allow time for New York attorneys to increase their pro bono
contributions voluntarily.1 5 If pro bono contributions do not in-
crease, he will propose that a mandatory rule be adopted.10 The
Chief Judge called for a voluntary program based upon the Mar-
Bryan R. Williams.
11 Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal Services, Final Report to the
Chief Judge of the State of New York (Apr. 1990) [hereinafter Marrero Committee Plan]
(available from Victor Marrero, Esq., Brown & Wood; and on file at the Brooklyn Law
School Library).
2 See Adams, Wachtler Defers Mandatory Pro Bono, N.Y.L.J., May 2, 1990, at 1,
col. 3 (Chief Judge Wachtler's Remarks) ("It would be difficult to overstate the intensity
of the debate that this simple proposal has generated."). See also Marrero Committee
Plan, supra note 11, at 7.
" Mandatory Po Bono, 74 A.B.A. J. 46 (May 1, 1988) (interviews with Esther
Lardent, pro bono specialist, Washington D.C.; and Alexander Forger, managing partner
at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy and a member of the Marrero Committee). See
also Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 140 (statement by Corbin) (voluntary
efforts by lawyers were not adequately considered by the Marrero Committee).
1" New York State Bar Ass'n, Report of the Special Committee to Review the Pro-
posed Plan for Mandatory Pro Bono Service (Oct. 16, 1989) [hereinafter State Bar Plan]
(available from NYSBA and on file at the Brooklyn Law School Library). The NYSBA
Special Committee was chaired by Justin L. Vigdor. Other members of the Committee
were: Peter J. Brevorka; James F. Dwyer, Thomas H. Elwood; Edward V. Esteve; Joseph
H. Farrell; John Gaal; Joseph S. Genova; Bruce E. Hansen; Eileen R. Kaufman; Muriel
S. Kessler, Thomas Maligno; James E. Reid; Jon N. Santemma; Charles W. Shorter, and
L. David Zube. Id. at 4 n.1, 42 (app. 3) (Summaries of Credentials of the Chair and
Members of the Special Committee to Review the Proposed Plan for Mandatory Pro
Bono Service). The State Bar Plan was adopted by the NYSBA House of Delegates in
October 1989. Vigdor, supra note 4, at 33.
11 Adams, supra note 12.
16 Id.
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rero Committee Plan without the mandatory element, in effect
merging the two proposals.17 Supporters of the mandatory pro
bono proposal called the Chief Judge's response a "fair and
statesmanlike resolution," "exhibiting extraordinary leadership
and sensitivity on this issue."18 In September 1990, the Chief
Judge appointed a Pro Bono Review Committee to monitor im-
plementation of the Marrero Committee Plan without the
mandatory element.29
17 Id.
18 Id. (quoting S. Oliensis, former president of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of
New York, and V. Marrero, Chairman of the Marrero Committee.)
2' Spencer, Chief Judge Names Panel to Monitor Pro Bono Effort, N.Y.L.J., Sept.
11, 1990, at 1, col. 3 (Co-chairpersons of the Pro Bono Review Committee are Victor
Marrero and Justin Vigdor. The other members are Joseph Genova and Robert Ostertag,
who head the NYSBA Committee on Access to Justice, which was formed by NYSBA
president to implement the State Bar Plan.). The Pro Bono Review Committee's first
assignment is to "accurately gauge" the amount of pro bono work currently provided. Id.
A debate has begun regarding how this information is to be collected and whether
all attorneys or a representative sample should be surveyed. See Spencer, Pro Bono Re-
porting by Individuals Opposed, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 26, 1990, at 1, col. 3. Opposition to the
survey is based on a perception that a survey is the first step toward promulgation of a
mandatory rule and will facilitate enforcement of a future mandatory rule. Spencer, Bar
Disagrees Over Measures on Pro Bono, N.Y.L.J., May 18, 1990, at 1, col. 3. Opposition to
the survey based on this perception was expressed to the special committee by Arthur
Norman Field, President of the New York County Lawyers Association, which has 10,500
members. Id. Leaders of six bar associations-the Bronx County Bar Association; Brook-
lyn Bar Association; Nassau County Bar Association; New York County Lawyers' Associ-
ation; Queens County Bar Association; and Westchester Bar Association-have endorsed
a proposal that the state bar reconsider its recommendation in the State Bar Plan for a
survey of all attorneys and instead use figures provided by local bar associations on par-
ticipation in the pro bono programs they administer. Spencer, Sept. 26, 1990, supra. The
survey was retained, however, because it was "needed to assess how well the voluntary
program worked [and] eliminating [it] . .. would 'eviscerate' the plan." Spencer, May
18, 1990, supra (quoting bar officials). Chief Judge Wachtler doubts that the objections
to a survey are widespread because his correspondence, he said, "indicates a desire on
the part of lawyers to tell how much they do to perform the pro bono service which they
are ethically obliged to perform . . . " Id.
In January 1991, the Pro Bono Review Committee announced it would send surveys
to 6,000 randomly selected attorneys across New York to be completed and returned
anonymously. Fox, 6,000 Lawyers to be Sent Pro Bono Poll, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 23, 1991, at 1,
col. 6. The survey will ask for information on each attorney's area of practice, geographic
location, pro bono work performed in 1991, and on why pro bono work may not have
been performed. The survey will be used to measure pro bono contributions for 1990 and
to ascertain the effectiveness of the state's efforts to increase pro bono work voluntarily.
Id. In late September 1991, the survey results were reported. See Spencer, Hall of
State's Lawyers Handle Pro Bono Work, N.Y.L.J., Sept..25, 1991, at 1, col. 3. Over 48%
of attorneys had done some pro bono work during the previous year. Forty-three percent
had done no pro bono work; of these, 24% indicated that they had no interest in per-
forming pro bono work. Id.
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The pro bono debate in New York has encouraged the bar
to discuss the legal needs of the poor and the professional obli-
gation of lawyers to help meet these needs.2 0 At the least, the
Marrero Committee Plan has served as a catalyst for new pro-
posals to improve the availability of legal services for the poor.2 1
This Note recommends that the Marrero Committee Plan
be adopted in New York State with certain minor changes. Part
I discusses the need for pro bono work, traces the development
of pro bono guidelines for attorneys, and then describes the
mandatory and voluntary plans proposed in New York State.
Part H of this Note demonstrates that a mandatory pro bono
rule will more effectively meet the demand for legal services
than a voluntary program. Part H then discusses how the Mar-
rero Committee Plan satisfies the major criticisms of a
mandatory pro bono rule and concludes with a brief analysis of
the nature of the pro bono obligation as a duty, rather than an
act of personal charity, which is owed by lawyers to the public
and to the courts.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Need to Increase Pro Bono Contributions
Most of the legal community agree that the problem of lack
of access to the legal system for. the poor is of concern to all
lawyers, but disagree on the extent to which pro bono work is an
appropriate response to solve the problem.22 There is a general
20 Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 8.
21 Adams, 9upra note 12.
Suddenly, everyone in the legal profession is willing to talk about ways to de-
liver legal services to the poor, and alternatives to mandatory pro bono are
forthcoming from every comer ....
For this contribution alone, the committee's work must be considered a
great success .... Their proposal has served as a much needed catalyst for
public discourse-nothing clarifies the mind like the sight of the gallows.
Id. (quoting Chief Judge Wachtler).
In addition to the State Bar Plan that was formulated in response to the Marrero
Committee proposal, the Interest on Lawyer Account (IOLA) Fund has given $1 million
to the New York Bar Foundation to be awarded to proposals across the state which will
"increas[e] the availability and effectiveness of pro bono legal services to poor people."
Dean, Voluntary or Mandatory Service?, N.Y.L.J., May 21, 1990, at 3, col 3 (Pro Bono
Digest). In 1991, the IOLA Fund awarded $13.5 million to 116 organizations across New
York State that provide civil legal services to the poor. IOLA Fund Press Release (Feb.
21, 1991).
Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 6-7. There is agreement that a aignifi-
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consensus that the best solution to meeting the legal needs of
the poor is increased funding for legal services programs.28 The
legal problems of the poor are best handled by professionals ex-
perienced in the field and available full-time to handle cases
that may require protracted appearances in court and which
may last for years. The Legal Needs Study reported that in in-
terviews with private attorneys it was often stated that pro bono
contributions cannot be considered a substitute for fully staffed
legal services offices.24 More funding would increase the availa-
bility of legal services by making it possible to provide more full-
time attorneys with expertise in poverty law and poverty issues.
Increased funding would provide resources to increase salary
levels, or to provide other financial incentives to attract attor-
neys to legal services offices.
Increases in funding are not likely to occur soon, however.
Federal funding for legal services has not increased beyond the
level established in 1980.25 New York State and local govern-
ment funding for legal services increased over the last decade,
but these funds are almost entirely allocated to specific legal ser-
vices programs or for targeted populations rather than for gen-
eral civil legal services offices.26 Funding for general civil legal
cant gap exists between the need for legal services and availability, but there is disagree-
ment on the extent of lawyers' responsibility to alleviate the situation. Almost all of the
New York bar associations are against a mandatory pro bone plan. Id. See also Enright,
Pro Bono Conference, 74 A.B.A. J. 122 (July 1, 1988) (in an informal survey, 95 of 129
attorneys attending a 1988 pro bono conference were against any mandatory pro bono
plan); Miskiewicz, supra note 4 (mandatory pro bone rule proposed in 1980 by the Com-
mission on Evaluation of Professional Standards (the Kutak Commission) was rejected
by the ABA); Emmanuel, Pro Bono Publico, 59 FLA. B.J. 4 (Dec. 1985) (President's Page)
(majority of lawyers are against a mandatory pro bono program according to bar polls).
23 See Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 26-27 ("(A]n arguably better so-
lution would be a quick, large infusion of federal, state and municipal funds to provide
civil legal services equal to the demand."); State Bar Plan, supra note 14, at 14-15
("[T]he complex problems of the poor, including their unmet legal needs, are fundamen-
tally societal problems, meriting broad governmental, publicly supported solutions....
[S]taff programs should be provided with sufficient resources because they are best
equipped to effectively and efficiently deliver legal assistance to the poor."); Adams,
supra note 12 (Chief Judge Wachtler stated, "[V]irtually everyone who has joined the
debate about mandatory pro bono agrees that the best way to provide legal services to
the poor is to increase funding for legal services and other social programs.").
24 Legal Needs Study, supra note 6, at 493.
5 Id. at 146-48, 203. See also note 4 supra.
26 Legal Needs Study, supra note 6, at 156-58. New York State funding for legal
services increased 418% between 1980 and 1987, from $2.6 million in 1980 to $10 million
in 1987. "While this infusion of state money is extremely important in meeting a variety
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services is minimal. Although private funding for legal services
in New York State has also increased over the last decade, it is
also mostly targeted to specific legal aid programs.28
Contributions by the private bar to increase the availability
of legal services for the poor are extensive and admirable; al-
though they also have not succeeded in closing the gap between
the need for civil legal services and the supply of those ser-
vices.28 These efforts include the American Bar Association Pri-
vate Bar Involvement Project, ° pro bono policies at private
firms,31 bar association programs to increase voluntarism,3 2 In-
of legal needs, it does not provide the kind of general purpose resources necessary to fill
the funding gap caused by LSC cutbacks, or to meet the increased need for full service
representation." Id. at 157. In 1987, 58% of state funding was restricted to the Disability
Advocacy Program (DAP), providing legal assistance to obtain, or reinstate, federal pub-
lic assistance benefits. Other major portions of state funding are earmarked for Prisoner
Legal Services Program funding and law school clinic programs, which do provide gen-
eral legal services. Id.
Local funding increased 267% between 1980 and 1987, from $1.26 million in 1980 to
$3.37 million in 1987. In 1987, about 88% of the funds were restricted to special pro-
grams. Id. at 158.
" Legal Needs Study, supra note 6, at 203. Federal legal services funds, IOLA funds
and United Way funds are the only unrestricted funds the legal services programs re-
ceive. Legal Services offices handled 138,000 cases, but this represented only about 4% of
the total number of noncriminal legal problems experienced by the poor. Id. For figures
on contributions by the IOLA Fund, see note 21 supra.
" Legal Needs Study, supra note 6, at 162. Private funding increased almost 100%
between 1980 and 1987, from $3.9 million in 1980 to $7.67 million in 1987.
29 Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 100-01, 105. See also State Bar Plan,
supra note 14, at 9-13.
-1 For description of the ABA Private Bar Involvement Project, see Note, supra
note 4, at 363 n.64.
" There are many examples of private law firm contributions. In the summer of
1990, a nationwide survey of 130 firms, with 86 responding, revealed an average contribu-
tion of 40 hours of pro bono work per year per attorney (double the Marrero Commit-
tee's proposed requirement of 40 hours per attorney every two years). Barr, Doers &
Talkers, ALL LAw., July-Aug. 1990, at 51. However, this average incorporated a wide
range between firms contributing far less and firms contributing far more. Id. at 56. See
also Dean, Projects Outside of New York, N.Y.L.J., July 16, 1990, at 3, col 3 (Pro Bono
Digest) (survey of several private firms' pro bono programs). In 1988, Skadden, Arp3,
Slate, Meagher & Flom set up a $10 million fellovship program to provide salaries over a
five-year period to 125 attorneys, each to work for two years in the public interest.
Labaton, Big Law Firm to Help Poor in Civil Cases, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1988, at B1,
col 5. But see Wechsler, supra note 4, at 913 nn.17-20 and accompanying text (conflict-
ing data on the levels of pro bono work contributed by attorneys); Wise, Only 1 in 4
Firms Report Keeping Pro Bono Pledges, N.Y.L.J., June 20, 1988, at 1, col. 1 (Volun-
teers of Legal Services, founded in 1984, obtained promises from 99 law firms and corpo-
rate law departments to contribute an average of 30 hours of pro bono work each year,
per attorney, but only 25% of the pledges were met.).
For example, The American Bar Association Torts and Insurance Practice Section
1991]
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terest on Lawyer Account (IOLA) Fund rules,33 fundraising ac-
tivities among groups of lawyers and law students,3 ' clinic pro-
grams administered through law schools, 5 and, in some
jurisdictions, expansion of the permissible role of legal
paraprofessionals.3 These efforts represent a significant contri-
bution and show a commitment by the legal profession to in-
crease access to the legal system for the poor.
Despite the public and private efforts, the needs of the poor
for legal services are still, to a large extent, unmet.37 The Legal
Needs Study identified only 432 full-time legal services attor-
neys to handle the needs of the poor of the entire state.3 Legal
services offices are operating at a "triage" level, turning away
serious cases in order to handle even more urgent ones.39
Council has instituted a policy for its members to provide 50 hours of pro bono work per
year. Around the ABA, 76 A.BA. J. 109 (Aug. 1990). The Suffolk County Bar has begun a
program to provide pro bono bankruptcy legal services in cooperation with Nassau Suf-
folk Law Services. N.Y.L.J., Sept. 4, 1990, at 1 (Today's News). The Queens County Bar
Association has begun a pilot pro bono program to provide civil legal services. Judge
Urges Bar Meet Pro Bono Challenge, N.Y.L.J., May 16, 1990, at 2, col. 6 (letter to the
editor from Queens County Civil Court Judge John A. Milano).
33 The IOLA program funds legal services for the poor from interest earned on cli-
ents' funds held in escrow accounts. N.Y.L.J., Oct. 3, 1990, at 1, col. 1 (Today's News).
See also IOLA Fund Press Release, supra note 21.
, Legal Aid Drive Nets $600,200, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 25, 1990, at 1, col. 5.
" Clinic programs are offered by all fifteen of the law schools in New York State.
Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 116. The Marrero Committee encourages law
school clinic programs recognizing that they provide a significant contribution, but the
Committee rejected a mandatory rule requiring law students to enroll in clinic programs.
Id. at 116-17. The State Bar Plan also endorsed law school clinic programs, recom-
mending that law schools expand these programs. State Bar Plan, supra note 14, at 36.
Some law schools have imposed or are considering imposing a public interest require-
ment in their curriculum. See Note, supra note 4, at 360 n.41 (Tulane, for example,
requires 20 hours service for indigent); Canellos, Harvard Law Students Endorse Free
Legal Work, Boston Globe, April 16, 1990, at 15 (students voted to include a public
interest requirement in the curriculum).
,1 California is considering licensing paralegals to perform certain legal services in
order to increase availability of these services. See California Is Poised to Let Paralegals
Go It Alone, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1990, at B5, col. 1; Non-Lawyer Legal Help, 76 A.B.A.
J. 40 (Oct. 1990).
" Legal Needs Study, supra note 6. See also notes 4, 25-28 and accompanying text
supra.
Legal Needs Study, supra note 6, at 204-05.
" Adams, supra note 12 (Chief Judge Wachtler stated, quoting the Ass'n of the Bar
of the City of New York, "[e]very legal service agency is compelled to conduct a daily,
continuing and agonizing triage: turning away the poor with desperate legal problems in
order to serve those with even more urgent problems.").
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By engaging in pro bono work, the private bar can make a
significant contribution to the problem by handling some of the
overflow, taking on new cases, and by working with nonprofit
and community organizations to alleviate conditions that give
rise to a need for legal services.' 0 For example, nonprofit com-
munity development organizations need legal assistance to
purchase buildings from absentee landlords, obtain loans, set up
cooperative housing associations, and handle general real estate
and tax problems. These activities generate more affordable
housing for the poor and thereby reduce the number of eviction
proceedings caused by nonpayment of rent.41
Proponents of both the mandatory and the voluntary pro
bono plans agree that society at large has the responsibility to
work to alleviate harsh conditions suffered by the poor, and that
increased funding for legal services offices would be the best so-
lution to the problem of access for the poor.2 Both proposals
acknowledge, however, that current levels of funding for legal
services programs are not sufficient and are not likely to increase
soon.43 The two plans represent efforts to increase pro bono con-
tributions to help close the gap between available legal services
for the poor and the actual need for those services.
B. Brief Chronology of the Development of the Lawyer's Pro
Bono Obligation
Professional acceptance of a pro bono obligation as an ethi-
cal responsibility has evolved over the past century." The 1908
4o See Legal Needs Study, supra note 6, at 51.
41 Id. See also Dean, Legal Needs in New York, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 20, 1959, at 3, col 1.
42 See Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 26-27; State Bar Plan, supra note
14, at 14-17.
4 Marerro Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 27; State Bar Plan, supra note 14, at
24.
" The roots of the pro bono obligation are ancient. See Millemann, Mandatory Pro
Bono in Civil Cases: A Partial Answer to the Right Question, 49 AID. L. Ram. 18, 19-24
(1990); Wechsler, supra note 4, at 911-12. The exact nature of the historical obligation is
debated. See Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. Ra. 735,
738 (1980) ("[TIhe 'duty to serve' in fact has a history shrouded in obscurity, ambiguity,
and qualification ... ."); Note, Court Appointment of Attorneys in Civil Cases, 81
CoLum. L Rv. 366, 374 (1981) (Solicitors, as officers of the court, had a duty to aid in
the administration of justice, including an obligation to assist the poor. Barristers, as
citizens responding to the King's commands, had a duty to accept court appointment
and provide free representation to the poor. American litigation attorneys' functions re-
semble more closely the English barristers' functions, and therefore the officer of the
1991]
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Canons of Professional Ethics included a pro bono duty to re-
present indigent criminal defendants and to aid in the adminis-
tration of justice.4 5 The 1969 ABA Code of Professional Respon-
sibility expanded this duty, stating that "a lawyer should assist
in improving the legal system, '46 and that "a lawyer should as-
sist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal coun-
sel available. '47 In 1975, the ABA resolved that "it is a basic
professional responsibility of each lawyer engaged in the practice
of law to provide public interest legal services. ' '48
In 1977, the ABA recommended that state and local bar as-
sociations adopt their own pro bono guidelines for their mem-
bers.49 Guidelines were to include quantifying the amount of pro
bono work expected, advising whether the obligation could be
met collectively, and whether "buyout" provisions were appro-
priate.50 Following the ABA recommendation, many bar associa-
tions adopted voluntary guidelines for their members. 1
court justification for a pro bono obligation arguably does not apply to them.).
4' Torres & Stansky, In Support of a Mandatory Public Service Obligation, 29 Em-
oRY L.J. 997, 997-98 (1980) (citing ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, Canons 2 and 4,
(1937)). See also Rosenfeld, Mandatory Pro Bono: Historical and Constitutional Per-
spectives, 2 CARDOZO L. REv. 255, 258 (1981).
46 Rosenfeld, supra note 45, at 259 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY Canon 8 (1969)).
47 Id. (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITY Canon 2 (1969)).
48 Id. at 260 (emphasis omitted) (citing ABA House of Delegates Res. on Public
Interest Legal Services (Aug. 1975), reprinted in ABA Special Comm'n on Public Inter-
est Practice, Implementing the Lawyer's Public Interest Practice Obligation 19-20 app.
(June 1977)). The full text of the resolution is printed in Rosenfeld, supra note 45, at
260 n.29.
'9 Rosenfeld, supra note 45, at 261. The recommendation was made by the ABA
Special Committee on Public Interest Practice.
'0 Id. Guidelines were also to include whether government attorneys and in-house
corporate counsel would be covered, how they could meet the obligation and the role the
bar association would play in aiding the lawyer to fulfill the obligation. Id.
81 Miskiewicz, supra note 4. See also Webster, Setting Pro Bono Standards, 69
MICH. B.J. 232 (Mar. 1990) (President's Page) (In Michigan, a voluntary pro bono stan-
dard of three cases per year, or 30 hours of service to an individual or an organization,
has been considered. The plan permits a buy out alternative by allowing a $300 contribu-
tion to any nonprofit organization that provides civil legal services to individuals or orga-
nizations.); Campbell, Why Is There a Debate Over Mandatory Pro Bono Work?, 26
ARiz. ATr'Y 14 (May 1990) (There is a debate because although the Code of Professional
Responsibility suggests pro bono work, only one third of attorneys do it.) After discus-
sion of a mandatory rule in Arizona, a voluntary standard of 50 hours of pro bono work
per year was recently adopted. The state is conducting a survey of current pro bono
services and will conduct a survey in two years to measure the impact of its voluntary
program. Id.
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The Association of the Bar of the City of New York pro-
posed a mandatory pro bono standard in 1978, which was re-
jected by its members.52 In 1980, the ABA Commission on Eval-
uation of Professional Standards (the Kutak Commission)
proposed a mandatory pro bono rule in their First Discussion
Draft of revisions to the ABA Model Rules.5 3 The proposed rule,
which did not include specific time requirements or enforcement
provisions, was rejected." A few bar associations have success-
fully adopted mandatory pro bono requirements as conditions of
membership.55 In addition, mandatory pro bono programs have
been adopted by a few courts where the need was severe. These
programs are restricted to specific areas of law, such as matri-
mony cases, and together the bar and court programs reach only
about 7,750 attorneys.58
C. The Marrero Committee's Mandatory Pro Bono Plan
The Marrero Committee issued its preliminary plan in June
1989.57 After holding four public hearings to receive "a full air-
ing within the legal community," the final plan was issued, in-
See Wechsler, supra note 4, at 918-19.
Torres & Stansky, supra note 45, at 999-1000.
See Lardent, supra note 2, at 92-98; Wechsler, supra note 4, at 919-20.
Bainbridge, Pro Bono Service: What's a Lawyer to Do?, 22 Mn. B.J. 13 (Sept.-Oct.
1989). One of the oldest mandatory pro bono programs was adopted in 1967 by the Or-
ange County Bar Association. Matin-Rosa & Stepter, Orange County-Mandatory Pro
Bono in a Voluntary Bar Association, 59 FLA. BJ. 21 (Dec. 1985). The Orange County
Bar Association program requires each member to take two cases per year, or to pay
$250 to the association. Id. Of 1500 members, about one-half choose the buyout provi-
sion, providing about $100,000 each year to the Orange County Legal Aid Office. Miskie-
wicz, supra note 4 (citing 1986 figures). For further description of the Orange County
plan, see Wechsler, supra note 4, at 935-37.
Other states, in addition to New York, are considering adopting a mandatory rule.
In Maryland, an Action Plan created by the Maryland Legal Services Corporation Advi-
sory Council called for a mandatory minimum of one pro bono case per attorney per
year, as well as other steps to increase the poor's access to the legal system. The
mandatory plan was temporarily rejected, and an ambitious voluntary program was un-
dertaken by the state government and judiciary branch. If the efforts are not succfsful,
Maryland's high court may impose a mandatory pro bono rule. See Cardin & Rhudy,
Expanding Pro Bono Legal Assistance in Civil Cases to Maryland's Poor, 49 MD. L.
REV. 1 (1990).
Miskiewicz, supra note 4. See also Wechsler, supra note 4, at 920-21, 935-38.
Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal Services, Preliminary Report to
the Chief Judge of the State of New York (June 30, 1989) (available from Victor Mar-
rero, Esq., Brown & Wood and on file at the Brooklyn Law School Library).
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corporating the public response.0 8 The Marrero Committee Plan
recognized that the best solution to the problem of access to the
legal system for the poor would be a large infusion of public
money to provide the needed legal services. However, given the
large amount needed and the immediate urgency of the problem,
the Committee found that it was unrealistic to expect that
enough money would be forthcoming soon.5
The Marrero Committee found the problem to be urgent. It
found that the legitimacy of the legal system itself is threatened
where, due to a lack of resources, a large number of people are
not receiving needed legal assistance. The Committee also noted
that laws established by the courts and the legislature to protect
the poor are not enforced because of a lack of legal representa-
tion.60 The Marrero Committee found that lawyers have a duty
to ensure access to the legal system based on their obligation as
professionals and as officers of the court, and on their possession
of "unique training and skills" and their "exclusive" possession
of the license to practice law.6 1 The proposal rejected reliance on
58 Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 5, 7 (Almost all professional bar as-
sociations were against a mandatory rule except for the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, which expressed reservations about some details of the plan; legal
services agencies and public interest organizations generally supported the plan; newspa-
per commentaries were also generally in support of the plan.). See also Wise, Bar Groups
Split on Mandatory Pro Bono Plan, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 20, 1989, at 1, col. 3 (While city bar
supported the proposal, "numerous" county bar associations were against it. The Na-
tional Lawyers Guild was opposed to the plan on the ground that it would weaken efforts
to get government funding for legal services offices.).
:' Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 25-27.
0o Id. at 14-15, 18-19. Without legal representation, the poor are unable to enforce
existing "remedial legislation" established to help them obtain basic essentials such as
"shelter, minimum levels of income and entitlements, unemployment compensation, dis-
ability allowances, child support, education, matrimonial relief and health care." Id. at
14-15 (citing Legal Needs Study, supra note 6). See also Labaton, supra note 31 (quot-
ing Chief Judge Sol Wachtler) ("[Tihere is no way we can say we've met our obligations
in the justice business, when access has become limited to only those who can afford
counsel."); Millemann, supra note 44, at 26-27 (surveying the legal needs of the poor and
the inadequacy of pro se representation to successfully assert rights that are "buried in
the complex language of lawyers"). But see Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at
140 (statement by Corbin) (crisis is not of such proportion as to justify a mandatory pro
bono requirement). The State Bar Plan chose not to debate "whether the vast need doc-
umented by the Study was or was not a 'crisis'." State Bar Plan, supra note 14, at 8 n.6.
"1 Marerro Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 9, 15, 19, 27.
We believe that lawyers, independent of their ordinary duty as citizens, have a
professional responsibility to mobilize their own resources in order to meet
these needs. This duty flows from the lawyer's role as a professional and an
officer of the court and arises particularly from the lawyer's possession of
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voluntarism as unlikely to produce enough of an increase in the
amount of pro bono work contributed.6 2 It also rejected a volun-
tary pro bono standard as condoning attorney nonparticipation
and found that insistence on a voluntary standard was "a rally-
ing cry for the status quo. '63
The proposal suggested a mandatory pro bono requirement
for every registered attorney admitted to practice to provide
forty hours of pro bono services every two years." The proposal
set forth three categories of "qualifying" pro bono services: (1)
direct legal representation of the poor in civil matters, or in
criminal matters where there is no government obligation to pro-
vide an attorney; (2) indirect representation of the poor through
activities designed to benefit the poor by improving the adminis-
tration of the justice system or workings of the legal process that
affect the poor; and (3) activities on behalf of "charitable, reli-
gious, civic and educational" organizations that assist the poor,
thereby preventing the need for legal services in the future.("
The proposed plan also provided "two notable exceptions":
a monetary contribution option whereby attorneys in firms of
ten or fewer attorneys, or groups of ten or fewer attorneys organ-
ized for purposes of the pro bono rule, could donate money in
lieu of their time (the "buy out" option); 6 and a group services
unique training and skills and of the exclusive, publicly granted franchise to
practice law ....
Moreover, the obligation stems, too, from the lawyer's responsibility to
promote the legitimacy, efficacy and equity of the legal system itself, all of
which are fundamentally undermined by permitting a vast gap to continue be-
tween the legal services required to procure basic human requirements and the
availability of those services.
Id. at 27-28.
1, Id. at 105 (despite "Herculean efforts" by bar associations to promote pro bono
contributions, only 10 to 15% of their members participate in volunteer programs).
I Id. at 106 (The majority of attorneys who currently rely on a minority of the
profession to fulfill the pro bono obligation are permitted to continue to do so since there
is no means by which to require nonparticipating attorneys to contribute their share
under a voluntary standard.).
Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 9-10, 34. If an attorney exceeded the
40 hour requirement, the surplus time could be carried forward and credited to the next
four years. Id. at 9-10, 72-73.
Id. at 47-56.
Id. at 59, 62. The monetary contribution option is designed to provide attorneys
with an alternate method of satisfying the obligation and is particularly suited to "spe-
cialists and other lawyers who truly could not render effective direct legal service3 to the
poor... as well as for government, legal services and corporate attorneys." Id. at 59-60.
The option could also be exercised where, because of other demands, contribution of
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option whereby attorneys in firms, or groups, of more than ten
attorneys could aggregate their pro bono activities (the "delega-
tion" option).6 To prevent assigning all pro bono work to the
newest attorneys in a firm, yet to encourage new attorneys to
experience pro bono work personally, attorneys admitted to the
bar for less than two years would not be included in aggregating
the firms', or groups', pro bono time units, and these new attor-
neys could not be assigned to fulfill the collective requirement.6
Three Marrero Committee members recommended defer-
ring consideration of a mandatory rule to allow time for efforts
to increase voluntarism to succeed.6 9 Two members dissented
from the plan, finding that the duty owed to the poor is societal
and should not be imposed only upon lawyers, and objecting to
the buy out and delegation options on the ground that the pro
bono obligation is a personal one.70 They also dissented on the
ground that the crisis is not so severe as to justify conscription,
and they questioned the court's authority to promulgate a rle
that would affect activities outside the court.71
D. The NYSBA's Voluntary Plan
The New York State Bar Association Special Committee
plan (State Bar Plan) was proposed in October 1989, in response
to the Marrero Committee's Preliminary Plan. 2 The State Bar
Plan found that legal services offices are best suited to serving
the poor because of their expertise, commitment, and full-time
availability," and it proposed to promote increased public and
private funding for legal services for the poor. Recognizing that
increased funding for legal services will not come quickly enough
personal time would present "financial hardship or practical difficulties." Id. at 60.
" Id. at 57. Solo practitioners could informally group together for the purpose of
aggregating their pro bono time requirement. Id. This provision permits firms to assign
their attorneys' pro bono time requirements to one or more attorneys most interested or
suited to pro bono assignment, and it permits the benefits that flow from the resources
and general support a firm can offer. Id. at 58.
" Id. at 58-59.
69 Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 133-36, 137, 145-47 (statements by
Davis, Gleason, and Fiske).
"0 Id. at 138-43 (statement by Corbin, joined by Dougherty).
71 Id.
72 State Bar Plan, supra note 14, at 1, 40 (app. 1) (Charge of the Special Committee
to Consider the Proposed Plan for Mandatory Pro Bono Service).
73 Id. at 15-16.
[Vol. 57: 177
MANDATORY PRO BONO
and that there is a pressing need, the State Bar Plan outlined
steps to encourage voluntarism by attorneys to help fill the de-
mand for legal services.7 4
The State Bar Plan proposed to increase voluntarism by: (1)
setting specific aspirational guidelines on the amount of pro
bono work each attorney should contribute; (2) proposing ways
to remove barriers such as the need for training, malpractice in-
surance and assistance with costs; (3) facilitating voluntarism by
a series of twenty steps designed to help the NYSBA coordinate
with local bar groups to create locally based proposals;7 (4) rec-
ommending an annual or biannual survey of attorneys' pro bono
work;76 and (5) encouraging participation by judges in providing
74 Id. at 13-14.
7 The twenty steps proposed in the State Bar Plan are: (1) adopt a resolution that
"assuring the provision of adequate legal services for the poor, including pro bona ser-
vices" is a primary purpose of a bar association; (2) assign the president-elect of the
NYSBA, each year, as head of the bar's pro bono campaign; (3) charge all sections of the
bar to report to the bar's executive committee, by June 1, 1990, on how their sections can
contribute or facilitate pro bono activities; (4) hire a pro bono coordinator who would
work to link the private bar with the needs of the community, (5) design, distribute
within 6 months, and collate results of a survey of all registered attorneys in New York
State to be distributed to local bar associations to determine their local needs and to
design "action plans"; (6) request "local needs assessment" and specific "action plans"
from local bar associations within 9 months; (7) consider ways to coordinate the activities
of NYSBA's Volunteer Lawyer Committee, the Committee on Legal Aid, and the Com-
mittee on Public Interest; (8) assure a pro bono presence at NYSBA annual and mid-
year meetings; (9) expand Pro Bono Service Awards, establish additional awards for legal
service professionals and for students; (10) appoint a committee to pursue ways to de-
velop a malpractice insurance fund to cover attorneys performing pro bono indepen-
dently of a legal services organization; (11) expand and simplify fee shifting or fee waiver
procedures such as the Equal Access to Justice Act and in forma pauperis procedures
that lower legal costs for the poor; (12) establish a pro bono program for state bar em-
ployees as a model for other employers; (13) consider how State Bar Continuing Legal
Education programs can be used as incentive or reward for pro bono efforts and as train-
ing for pro bono work; (14) develop a statewide campaign and theme; (15) request that
the governor designate a pro bono week; (16) feature articles on pro bono work regularly
in the New York State Bar Journal; (17) develop, print and distribute a brochure for
attorneys on pro bono work;, (18) coordinate with the court system on ways to use pro
bono services efficiently; (19) coordinate with other statewide bar asociations; and (20)
coordinate with, and encourage, pro bono activities of other statewide professional orga-
nizations. Id. at 29-31.
"' Id. at 31-33. Step 5 of the State Bar Plan calls for an annual or biannual survey of
attorneys' pro bono activities. If a "respected third party foundation, university or other
organization" is not found within one year to undertake this survey, the State Bar Plan
suggests that the NYSBA fund the surveys; and if this is not feasible, the State Bar Plan
recommends as a last resort that Rule 118.1 of the Rules of the Chief Administrator be
amended to include a section wherein attorneys would report their pro bono work of the
prior two years. Id. at 33-34. See N.Y. CoMP. CODFS R. & REGs. tit. 22, § 118 (1986)
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training and public support. The State Bar Plan adopted a vol-
untary standard for every New York attorney to provide twenty
hours per year of pro bono services to the poor, or to donate an
equivalent amount in earnings to an organization that provides
legal services to the poor.7 7
The State Bar Plan rejected mandatory pro bono as ineffec-
tive because "effort expended voluntarily will normally produce
far more quality results than will conscripted effort."78 The New
York State Bar Association Special Committee recommended
deferring the consideration of any mandatory pro bono plan for
at least three years in order to allow sufficient time for the State
Bar Plan to succeed.79
The New York State Bar Association organized a committee
to implement the State Bar Plan.80 Thus, the effort to increase
voluntary pro bono contributions in New York State includes
(Registration of Attorneys).
Similarly, the mandatory plan suggested amending Rule 118.1 for attorneys to re-
port their compliance with the rule. Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 90. The
State Bar Plan provides a suggested form to collect the information on pro bono contri-
butions. State Bar Plan, supra note 14, at 61 app. 7 (Draft of a Statewide Survey of
Attorneys with Respect to Their Pro Bono Activities). The form separates pro bono work
into nine categories: (1) direct representation in civil matters where there is a right to an
appointed lawyer but none was appointed; (2) direct representation in civil matters
where there is no right to an appointed lawyer; (3) direct representation in criminal mat-
ters where there is no right to an appointed lawyer; (4) indirect representation through
activities simplifying access to the legal system for the poor; (5) legal work for a charita-
ble organization dedicated to aiding the poor; (6) service on 18B panels; (7) legal services
for charitable organizations that are not dedicated to aiding the poor; (8) work for bar
associations or other organizations to improve the legal system; and (9) any other activi-
ties the attorney considers "pro bono publico" and for which the attorney did not receive
pay. The attorney would fill in the number of hours contributed in the past two years in
any category. In addition, financial contributions to organizations that provide legal ser-
vices to the poor would be reported. Id. For objections to the survey in the legal commu-
nity, see note 19 supra.
Id. at 24-25. "Any attorney who does not [provide pro bono services], for
whatever reason, should recognize and honor a moral obligation to make a financial con-
tribution, commensurate with his or her resources and the actual or imputed opportunity
cost of the time not so spent, to an organization dedicated to providing legal services to
the poor." Id. at 25.
78 Id. at 37.
71 Id. at 1.
80 The state bar's Committee on Access to Justice was appointed by the NYSBA
president and consisted of twenty-two members from across New York State. Spencer,
Bar Disagrees Over Measures on Pro Bono; County Lawyers Object to Reporting of
Hours, N.Y.L.J., May 18, 1990, at 1, col. 3. The Committee's purpose was to work with
local bar associations to identify local legal services needs and organize local training
programs for volunteers to meet those needs. Id.
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two forces implementing a voluntary standard. There is the
State Bar Plan being implemented by the New York State Bar
Association Committee on Access to Justice, and the Marrero
Committee Plan, without its mandatory element, being imple-
mented by the Pro Bono Review Committee appointed by Chief
Judge Wachtler.1l Because a voluntary standard was kept, New
York State's attorneys have had an opportunity to choose to
participate in pro bono programs and avoid the need for a
mandatory rule."2
11. COMPARING THE POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MAN-
DATORY AND VOLUNTARY PRO BONO PLANS
This Note argues that a mandatory pro bono plan should be
adopted in New York State because it will more effectively raise
the level of pro bono contributions than will reliance on a volun-
tary pro bono standard. This increase can significantly ease the
problem of access to the legal system by providing an essential
supplement to current efforts by federal, state and local govern-
ment, and by the legal profession, to address the legal needs of
New York's poor.
Reliance on a voluntary plan will not produce a significant
change from the current level of pro bono contributions because
the plan is unlikely to motivate individual lawyers to contribute.
By definition, the voluntary plan relies for its success on a per-
sonal commitment by most attorneys to fulfill the professional
obligation. The plan does not contain enough incentives to in-
crease voluntarism.55
The State Bar Plan seeks to achieve increased pro bono ser-
vices through a range of promotional efforts. It relies on peer
pressure and the threat of a future mandatory rule to increase
the level of pro bono contributions. The state bar is limited to
providing incentives, such as awards, in the voluntary plan."'
Another incentive is the prospect of publicity by publishing an
81 See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
8If pro bono contributions increase from current levels, a mandatory rule will not
be imposed. See Adams, supra note 12.
See Lardent, supra note 2, at 102; Wechsler, supra note 4, at 922 n.84.
The state bar recognizes and encourages pro bono efforts through the New York
State Bar Association President's Pro Bono Service Award. The State Bar Plan proposed
to expand these awards. State Bar Plan, supra note 14, at 30.
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article in the bar journal. Continuing education "certificates" or
"vouchers" in return for pro bono hours are also considered in-
centives that will increase pro bono contributions.
The most important element of the State Bar Plan to rein-
force personal motivation is the imposition of an annual, or bi-
annual, survey. In addition to providing the state with informa-
tion on pro bono efforts and a mechanism for measuring and
comparing voluntarism levels over time, the survey can act as a
regular official "reminder" to attorneys, each time they complete
it, of their obligation to perform pro bono work. As envisioned
by the voluntary plan, the survey is to include all registered at-
torneys in New York State. 5 To provide additional incentives,
the plan should also encourage firms to count pro bono work, or
a portion thereof, as "billable hours," and to consider pro bono
activities in their decisions regarding promotions, bonuses and
partnership.
Indirectly, the plan relies on the threat of a mandatory rule
as an incentive for local bar associations to cooperate. Even with
this threatened implementation of a mandatory pro bono pro-
gram, it is not clear that enough attorneys in New York State
will respond to the call for increased voluntarism. The threat of
a mandatory pro bono rule may not be enough of a motivator.
Although, according to most polls, the majority of attorneys do
not want a mandatory program, the majority of attorneys cur-
rently involved in mandatory programs have not expressed diffi-
culty complying with the rule.86
Even if volunteer efforts do initially increase, there is a
problem of maintaining the increased level of commitment over
time. To have effect, a significant commitment and financial ex-
pense will be needed.87 Cooperation between the NYSBA, local
bar associations, the court system, and the political branch are
necessary for the plan to succeed.8 8 In addition, there are a sig-
" State Bar Plan, supra note 14, at 26.
" Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 23 (citing Dean, Two Model Pro-
grams, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 21, 1987, at 1, col. 1 (Pro Bono Digest); Marin-Rosa & Steptor,
Orange County-Mandatory Pro Bono in a Voluntary Bar Association, supra note 55;
Miskiewicz, Mandatory Pro Bono Won't Disappear, supra note 4. See also Marrero
Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 110-11. But see Wechsler, supra note 4, at 944 passim
(survey of attorneys participating in two mandatory pro bono programs indicates that
most of these attorneys are opposed to a mandatory pro bono rule).
87 See notes 74-75 and accompanying text supra.
" Id.
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nificant number of attorneys in New York State who are not
members of a bar association and who will not be reached by the
plan.8
9
A mandatory program is a simple and direct route to
achieving the goal of increased access to the legal system for the
poor.e° A mandatory pro bono rule would increase significantly
the amount of legal services available because it would reach all
of New York State's registered attorneys. Currently, only about
ten to fifteen percent of New York's eighty-eight thousand li-
censed attorneys participate in pro bono activities.,1 A
mandatory rule would increase the availability of legal services
by providing a large cadre of attorneys on a regular basis. The
mandatory rule would also provide a significant increase in
funding for legal services because of the fees that would be gen-
erated by those attorneys electing the buyout option in lieu of
contributing time.9 2
The Marrero Committee Plan limits the buyout option to
solo practitioners and groups of ten or fewer attorneys. To maxi-
mize the fundraising potential of a mandatory plan, this limita-
tion should be eliminated, and the buyout option should be
available to all attorneys, as it is in the State Bar Plan.03 If one-
half of all New York attorneys elected the buyout option, about
" Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 105 (approximately one-half of New
York attorneys do not belong to a professional bar association).
90 Mandatory Pro Bono, 74 ABA. J. 46 (May 1, 1988) (At Issue) ("[Mandatory pro
bono is] just a good, straight-forward, simple way of approaching the problem. As attrac-
tive as sheer voluntarism is, it simply isn't working.") (quoting Alexander Forger, manag-
ing partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy and a member of the Marrero
Committee).
91 Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 22, 99. See also Legal Needs Study,
supra note 6, at 191-93, 206-07 (estimates are based on reports from local and state bar
associations; pro bono participation outside of organized bar programs has not yet been
reliably measured). However, results of the statewide survey conducted in 1991 by the
Pro Bono Review Committee indicate a higher percentage participation rate among indi-
vidual attorneys registered in New York responding to the survey, as well as a significant
percentage who do not participate. See note 19 supra.
92 Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 60 (the funds should be expended on
full-time legal services attorneys with expertise in areas such as housing law and govern-
ment entitlement programs where volunteer attorneys are less effective). See note 66 and
accompanying text supra (explanation of Marrero Committee Plan's buyout option).
"' The Marrero Committee gave three reasons for choosing to limit the availability
of the buyout option: first, to give solo practitioners and smaller firms' attorneys an ad-
vantage; second, to encourage personal participation by attorneys; and third, to prevent
larger firms from crediting their financial contributions towards fulfilling their attorneys'
pro bono obligations. Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 70.
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$8.8 million would be raised every two years.9 This would re-
present an amount equivalent to almost the entire annual fund-
ing for legal services provided by New York State alone." The
combined annual funding for legal services in New York State
provided by state, local and private sources would be increased
by almost half.9 In addition, assuming that the number of attor-
neys in the state continues to grow each year, this source of
funding would increase each year.
A. Major Criticisms of a Mandatory Pro Bono Rule
The route to a mandatory rule is fraught with contention. 7
This Note recognizes that even if a mandatory rule would in-
crease significantly the amount of legal services available to the
poor, this increase would not be sufficient reason to impose such
a rule if the burden on attorneys were too onerous, or if adminis-
tration of the plan were too costly. However, the Marrero Com-
mittee Plan has successfully incorporated most of the criticisms
of a mandatory rule by providing a flexible choice of services,
and by proposing a simple self-enforced administration that
dovetails with preexisting, biannual registration and disciplinary
procedures.
The major criticisms of a mandatory pro bono rule dis-
cussed in this section are grouped in two parts: (1) objections to
any mandatory pro bono rule; and (2) objections to specific ele-
ments of the Marrero Committee Plan. The general arguments
" This calculation is based on the Marrero Committee proposal of $50.00 per hour,
which was selected by the Committee based on the rate paid in federal courts to lawyers
appointed to represent the indigent in criminal cases. Marrero Committee Plan, supra
note 11, at 64. The mandatory pro bone rule in effect in Orange County includes a
buyout provision, and administrators report that about one-half of all attorneys elect the
buyout option. See Marin-Rosa & Stepter, supra note 55, at 21; Wechsler, supra note 4,
at 936.
" New York State funding in 1987 amounted to $10 million. See note 26 and ac-
companying text supra.
" State, local and private contributions for 1987 amounted to $21.04 million. See
notes 26, 28 and accompanying text supra.
" Adams, supra note 12, at 2, col. 3 ("I am not unmindful of the arguments that
there would be an inevitable legal and philosophical confrontation were we to mandate
pro bone service.") (quoting Chief Judge Wachtler). See also Graham, Mandatory Pro
Bono: The Shape of Things to Come?, 73 ABA J. 62 (Dec. 1, 1987) (There is a "litany of
philosophical, legal and practical reasons" given in opposition to a mandatory pro bone
program.); Wechsler, supra note 4, at 921 n.78 passim (polls show majority of attorneys
are against a mandatory pro bono rule).
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addressed are: the constitutionality of a mandatory pro bono
rule; the "reluctant advocate" problem; the "chilling effect" on
voluntarism possibly caused by such a rule; the unpopularity of
the rule among lawyers; and finally, the "matching skills" prob-
lem. The specific arguments then addressed are: the buyout and
delegation features of the proposed plan; the expense of admin-
istration, oversight and enforcement of such a rule; and finally,
the need for malpractice insurance for attorneys providing pro
bono services.
1. Arguments Against Imposition of Any Mandatory Pro
Bono Rule
Opponents of a mandatory pro bono rule protest that it may
be unconstitutional under the Fifth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The Marrero Committee Plan considered the
constitutional issues raised by a mandatory pro bono rule in a
separate appendix to the report. 9 Reviewing relevant cases and
standards, the Committee rejected the "involuntary servitude,"
"taking without compensation," "due process" and "equal pro-
tection" arguments. 100 Commentators support the Marrero Com-
mittee conclusion.101 The Supreme Court has never ruled on the
question of whether a mandatory requirement would be consti-
tutional. Courts have been reluctant to rule that a mandatory
" See Adams, supra note 12, at 2, coL 3 ("The arguments have already been raised
that [a mandatory pro bono plan] would be taking property without just compensation,
that it would be involuntary servitude, that it would affect the equal protection of the
law.") (quoting Chief Judge Wachtler). See also notes 101-02 and accompanying text
infra (cases and commentary on the constitutionality of a mandatory pro bono rule for
attorneys).
"Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 153 app. C (Constitutional and Statu-
tory Issues).
1o Id.
101 See, Rosenfeld, supra note 45, at 288-95 (not a taking where government is en-
forcing a preexisting obligation owed to the public; not involuntary servitude where gov-
ernment calling for service to meet a public need and where one is free to choose another
calling;, not an equal protection violation where there is a rational relationship with the
government's interest and the requirement reaches all lawyers); Millemann, supra note
44, at 65-68 (constitutional arguments are "strained at best"; for a taking there must be
showing of irreparable and permanent injury or that property value was entirely de-
stroyed). For a survey of scholars' opinions and cases, see Cardin & Rhudy, supra note
55, at 11 n.58; Rofes, Ducking the Question: Some Observations on Mallard v. United
States District Court and the Case of the Unwilling Lawyer, 55 BROOKLYN L RaV. 1129,
1136 n.35 (1990). For a helpful review of the constitutional arguments, see also Note,
supra note 4, at 366-69.
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appointment of an attorney is constitutional,102 but the
mandatory pro bono plan, which permits an attorney to choose
when and how to fulfill the obligation, allows an attorney far
more choice than an attorney asked to accept a specific case.10 3
Where the need is great enough, and the burden placed on attor-
neys is flexible, a mandatory pro bono rule should withstand
constitutional scrutiny.
It is asserted that a mandatory pro bono requirement is im-
practicable and counterproductive because of doubts about the
effectiveness of any representation where the attorney has been
forced to accept the case. It is feared that a mandatory pro bono
rule would generate a "reluctant advocate" situation whereby an
attorney, taking on a case simply to satisfy his or her obligation
under the rule, would not represent the client as'zealously as he
or she would handle private clients.10 4 The poor are best served
by attorneys "who stand at their side willingly."'10 This fear
seems unfounded in practical terms because by providing nu-
merous and flexible categories of acceptable service, an attorney
under the mandatory plan would not be put in the position of
accepting a case against her will. 10 6
It is also feared that a mandatory pro bono rule will have a
102 See Cardin & Rhudy, supra note 55, at 11 n.58. In Mallard v. United States
District Court, 490 U.S. 296 (1989), the Court avoided deciding whether federal courts
have the power to compel an attorney to accept a case by restricting the decision to
interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982). The statute provides that a federal court
may "request" an attorney to represent an indigent civil litigant. Justice Brennan who
authored the 5 to 4 decision, held that "request" was not intended to mean "require"
and that an attorney could refuse to serve. For commentary on Mallard, see Rofes, supra
note 101; Note, The Constitutionality of Compulsory Attorney Service: The Void Let
by Mallard, 68 N.C.L. REv. 575 (1990). Unlike the situation in Mallard, the Marrero
Committee Plan contains a wide scope of qualifying services that an attorney could per-
form to satisfy the requirement, see note 65 and accompanying text supra, as well as
containing buyout and delegation options, see notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra.
Thus no attorney would be in Mallard's position of being asked to take a case in which
he had no expertise.
'" Cardin & Rhudy, supra note 55, at 11 n.58. See also Rofes, supra note 101, at
1136 n.35 (survey and discussion of court decisions on constitutionality of compulsory
uncompensated appointment of attorneys).
10, See Cardin & Rhudy, supra note 55, at 12; Millemann, supra note 44, at 60-61.
'05 Adams, supra note 12, at 2, col. 4 ("Voluntary service is obviously preferable to
compulsory service in any endeavor.") (quoting Chief Judge Wachtler). See also State
Bar Plan, supra note 14, at 37.
104 Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 109-10. The Marrero Committee
Plan also rejects this criticism as an injustice to the majority of attorneys. Id.
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chilling effect on voluntarism;10 7 on contributions to legal aid
programs; 108 or that it would relieve government of its obligation
to provide legal services for the poor. The Marrero Committee
rejected these arguments, finding that they would apply equally
to voluntary or mandatory plans to increase pro bono services.100
A mandatory plan is disliked in principle by the majority of
attorneys."'0 More information on attorneys' objections to a
mandatory rule will be gained from the survey of six thousand
attorneys being conducted by the Pro Bono Review Commit-
tee.11 The Marrero Committee heard objections from govern-
ment lawyers concerned that they already are fulfilling their ob-
ligation by working at lower salaries and under poorer
conditions than most private attorneys, and concerned that their
public positions prevent them from taking on volunteer cases.
Private business corporation lawyers expressed concerns that
11 Graham, supra note 97. See also Metz, Lauw'ers Pondering Pro Bono Legal Aid,
N.Y. Times, May 7, 1989, § 12 (Long Island), at 12, col 5 (Nassau and Suffolk Bar
Associations say a mandatory pro bono rule would cut into volunteer efforts); Wise, Bar
Groups Split on Mandatory Pro Bono Plan, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 20, 1989, at 1, col 3 (Sullivan
& Cromwell partner states that a mandatory pro bono rule would cut into the "bur-
geoning" voluntarism movement). But see Labaton, Big Law Firm to Help Poor in Civil
Cases, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1988, at B1, col 5 (a mandatory rule would have no effect on
Skadden, Arps public interest fellowship fund); Millemann, supra note 44, at 64
(mandatory pro bono rule unlikely to have an effect on current levels of voluntarism);
Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 109-10 ("inconceivable" that attorneys
would reduce their levels of pro bono work under a mandatory pro bono plan).
10' See The Legal Aid Society, Legal Aid Society Pro Bono Plan Report, N.Y.L.J.,
Dec. 8, 1989, at 2, col 3 ("[The buyout provision] should not be set so high as to become
a substitute for the contributions of both people and money that (are now made] to The
Legal Aid Society and elsewhere.").
109 Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 109-12.
110 Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 7. See also Margolick, New York
Panel Urges Lawyers to Aid the Poor, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1989, at Al, col. 1 (Chief
Judge Wachtler has received "an 'enormous' amount of mail from lawyers against com-
pulsory public service.").
" See Fox, supra note 19. See also Wechsler, supra note 4. Professor Wechsler
conducted a survey of 700 attorneys from four geographic areas to gain insight into attor-
neys' attitudes regarding mandatory pro bono. Most of the surveys were sent out in 1938.
Id. at 933. Following analysis of the results of the survey, Professor Wechsler sugge3ts
guidelines for designing a mafidatory pro bono rule that will not be onerous on attorneys.
Id. at 951-58. The Marrero Committee Plan incorporates all of these recommendations,
except- (1) Professor Wechsler recommends that the buyout option be made available to
all attorneys. Id. at 953; and (2) Professor Wechsler suggests pro bono clients should pay
a small fee, as low as $10.00, if they are able to, as a symbolic recognition of the value of
the services received. Id. at 958. This Note also recommends that the buyout option be
available to all attorneys. See note 130 and accompanying text supra.
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their employers would bear some of the cost of their contributed
time.1
12
The Marrero Committee Plan rejected exempting any attor-
neys from the rule, preferring a "universal" standard to support
the credibility and effectiveness of the rule.113 Where govern-
ment attorneys are prohibited from legal work outside of their
positions, the Marrero Committee urged that the rules be
amended. 114 The Marrero Committee noted that some public
agencies have already begun to ease regulations of this type.1" 5
Further, the Marrero Committee urged that business corpora-
tions should accept any additional costs resulting from a
mandatory pro bono rule, "within reasonable limits," as a cost of
doing business.111 Government lawyers and public interest or-
ganization lawyers with expertise in poverty law and poverty is-
sues could conduct training programs as a method of fulfilling
their pro bono time requirement."7 In any case, the proposed
mandatory rule would allow for exceptions to be made on a case-
by-case showing of special circumstances.""s
Another frequent objection to a mandatory rule is the per-
ceived difficulty of matching the skills of the private bar to the
needs of the poor."19 The mandatory rule would permit a range
of qualifying services in addition to direct legal representation of
n1 Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 41.
11 Id. at 38.
114 Id. at 39.
... Id. at 39-40. Federal agencies including the Justice Department have established
policies encouraging pro bono work by their attorneys following an executive order in
1979. Id. The Marrero Committee noted that New York State Department of Civil Ser-
vice rules that currently permit paid leaves of absence for professional activities "directly
related to the employee's profession or professional duties" could be slightly adjusted to
permit state government lawyers to fulfill a professional pro bono requirement. Id. at 40
(citing Rules & Regs. of the Dept. of Civil Service, N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW §§ 28-1.9, 28-
1.12-1.15 (McKinney Supp. 1989)).
"' Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 41. The Marrero Committee found it
"unlikely that private corporations would discourage or impede their law department
attorneys from fulfilling a pro bono legal services obligation." Id.
11 Id. at 42.
.. Id. at 36. Exemptions would be made for "incapacity by reason of illness....
unusual financial constraint or personal hardship ... or long personal or business ab-
sence from the jurisdiction." Id. at 37.
11 See Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 146 (statement by Fiske)
("[Sipecialized knowledge and experience [are needed in] . . . areas in which the vast
majority of lawyers who would be subject to the (rule] ... have little or no
experience.").
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the poor. 120 Mechanisms already exist that coordinate pro bono
work and notify attorneys of clients needing legal help in specific
areas.' 21 In addition, "private attorneys are educable. 1 22 In pri-
vate practice, attorneys are often required to research new
causes of action, or learn about unfamiliar types of business
transactions, for their paying clients. The legal needs of the poor
are varied and do not all require expertise in poverty law. 2 3 Fi-
nally, to assist private attorneys to serve the poor, there are al-
ready many training programs offered by bar associations and
legal services organizations.2 4
2. Arguments Against Specific Elements of the Proposed
Mandatory Pro Bono Rule
a. The Buyout and Delegation Options
Those who view the pro bono obligation as a purely ethical
duty consider the buyout and delegation elements of the plan to
be loopholes for the elite, enabling larger firms and wealthier at-
torneys to shirk their obligation. 25 " Opposition to these provi-
sions is based on a perception that the pro bono obligation is a
personal one. 26 One of the benefits of providing pro bono work
120 Id. at 47-56. See text accompanying note 65 supra for a description of the quali-
fying services.
2I See Dean, The Year Ahead, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 17, 1990, at 1, col 1 (Pro Bono Di-
gest) ("There are many organizations in the city that run excellent pro bono programs
.... Volunteers of Legal Service [can put lawyers in touch with these organizations].").
1I2 Millemann, supra note 44, at 61.
13 See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
124 For some examples of training programs, see Curtin, Hope for the Homeless, 76
A.BA J. 8 (Dec. 1990) (ABA Representation of the Homeless Project provides asistance
to individual attorneys, law firms, bar associations and law schools to set up programs to
aid the homeless with their legal needs); N.Y.L.J., Sept. 25, 1990 at 1, col 1 (Today's
News) (announcing all-day training program sponsored by the City Bar to assist refu-
gees); N.Y.L.J., Oct. 22, 1990, at 1, col 2 (Today's News) (evening training program
given by city bar and The Council of New York Law Associates on areas of pro bono
services).
121 See Chambers, Lawyers Find Loopholes In Pro Bono, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 1, 1990, at
13, col. 4 (Sua Sponte Column).
18 The proposed mandatory plan put forth by the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of
New York did not permit attorneys to buyout or delegate their duty. Torres & Stansky,
supra note 45, at 1010. See also Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 141-42
(statement by Corbin) (pro bono is a personal obligation and should not be delegable or
sellable by a large number of lawyers).
Both the mandatory and voluntary plans proposed in New York State include
buyout provisions. See notes 66, 77 and accompanying text supra. These "exceptions"
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is the personal satisfaction that it brings, and the increased
awareness of "the problems at the bottom. ' 127
The buyout and delegation exceptions in the plan were in-
cluded in order to neutralize several common objections to a
mandatory rule.12 Attorneys whose areas of expertise are not
easily transferrable to the legal needs of the poor, or who for any
reason prefer not to contribute time, may select one of these op-
tions to satisfy their obligation.129
The Marrero Committee Plan restricts the buyout option to
attorneys in groups of ten or fewer and restricts the delegation
option to groups of more than ten attorneys. These alternative
options should be made available to all attorneys regardless of
whether they work alone or in groups because these alternatives
increase the flexibility of the plan and increase access of the
poor to the legal system.130
In recognition of the "personal satisfaction" benefits of pro
bono, the Marrero Committee Plan excludes new attorneys from
the buyout or delegation options.13' This exception for new at-
torneys might seem inconsistent because the specific goal of the
Marrero Committee Plan is to increase the availability of legal
services for the poor by enforcing a preexisting obligation to the
court system. However, in addition to providing new attorneys
with the opportunity to experience pro bono work, the exception
also prevents new attorneys from being relied upon exclusively
to fulfill the aggregate time requirements of other attorneys. Be-
cause of this practical purpose, the exception for new attorneys
should be retained.
The mandatory plan proposed by the Marrero Committee
set a contribution rate of fifty dollars per hour which could be
donated, in lieu of time, to any organization or fund the individ-
ual attorney selects, as long as the purpose of the organization or
fund meets the eligibility critieria of the plan by being specifi-
can be viewed as alternatives; an attorney is still fulfilling his or her obligation but has
elected to do it in a way other than by providing time. Marrero Committee Plan, supra
note 11, at 59-60.
1 See Chambers, supra note 125, at 13; Cardin & Rhudy, supra note 55, at 13.
Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 59-60.
129 Id.
.. See note 92 and accompanying text supra (alternate argument for eliminating
the limitation on the buyout option). See also notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra
(description of the buyout and delegation options).
"' Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 58-59.
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cally aimed at addressing needs of the poor.132 The voluntary
plan recommended that attorneys contribute an amount
equivalent to the value of their time, although this amount could
be determined by the individual attorney. 3 The voluntary
plan's proposed standard for setting an alternative contribution
amount takes into account the disparate economic circumstances
of attorneys across New York State. The Marrero Committee
Plan's standard sets a uniform amount which is based on the
current compensation rate for court-appointed attorneys in fed-
eral criminal cases.3 4 The Marrero Committee's standard is
preferable because it is simpler to administer and, where it
would cause economic hardship, an attorney could apply for a
special circumstances exception. 35
b. Administrative Burden
It is feared that a mandatory rule would be expensive to
administer, requiring staff and oversight, and that many attor-
neys would need a malpractice insurance fund for their repre-
sentation of the poor. Although a mandatory plan may cost more
to administer than the State Bar Plan, the plan is designed to
cost as little as possible. The rule would be promulgated by the
Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals. 3  The rule would be
1M2 See Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 62-63. See also note 66 and ac-
companying text supra.
The contributed money could also go into a fund to pay for court fees incurred in
providing pro bono services, to recoup legal services organizations for the costs of train-
ing and supervising volunteer attorneys, and to hire full-time legal services attorneys.
See Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 60-61.
I8 State Bar Plan, supra note 14, at 25. "Since our goal is aspirational, and since it
may be met either by rendering service or contributing money, we believe that there are
decidedly few attorneys who should exempt themselves from doing one or the other." Id.
at 26 n.13.
'3' Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 64.
"I See note 118 and accompanying text supra.
a6 M rrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 88. The Marrero Committee Plan
argues that promulgating such a rule would be within the court's authority because the
focus of the scope of qualifying services would be on improving the por's access to the
court system. Qualifying services would include activities outside of the court, but these
activities would affect the court by avoiding legal action (such as avoiding eviction pro-
ceedings by developing lowercost housing). This would ease the need of the poor for legal
services and relieve the administrative strain on the court system. But see id. at 143
(Statement by Corbin) (A mandatory pro bono rule would exceed the court's authority
because the rule would cover many activities outside the court.).
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mainly self-enforced. 137 Attorneys would report their compliance
on their biennial licensing registration forms.138 Discipline for
noncompliance, review of applications for exemptions to the
rule, and decisions on whether a certain service was within the
rule's scope of qualifying services would all require administra-
tion, which would be handled by the various departments of the
Appellate Division,39 acting under the Chief Judge and the
Chief Administrator of the Court of Appeals. 40 The legal profes-
sion is for the most part self-regulated, and a mandatory pro
bono rule need not vary from this norm.
The NYSBA asserts that by adopting a voluntary plan, New
York will avoid the litigation and debate that would be pro-
duced by a mandatory rule over such issues as the constitution-
ality of mandatory service and the court's authority to imple-
ment a mandatory rule.14 1 Indeed, this is one of the reasons that
Chief Judge Wachtler elected to wait two years before judging
the effectiveness of the voluntary plan.142 If the voluntary plan is
not successful, these costs will have to be borne in order to es-
tablish the new rule. However, it is this Note's contention that a
flexible but effective mandatory pro bono rule would prevail in
litigation, and the costs of litigation would be outweighed by the
increase in services produced under a mandatory pro bono rule.
B. The Extent of the Pro Bono Obligation: Charity or Profes-
sional Duty?
Both the State Bar Plan and the Marrero Committee Plan
were premised on a commitment to the principle of equal access
to justice. 43 The underlying goal of each plan was to increase
137 Id. at 92-93.
138 Id. at 90.
139 Id. at 90-91. The Appellate Division already has responsibility, under the super-
vision of the Chief Judge and the Chief Administrator, for disciplining attorneys for pro-
fessional misconduct. Id.
140 Id. at 91.
1 State Bar Plan, supra note 14, at 38. See also Vigdor, supra note 4, at 35.
12 Adams, supra note 12, at 2, col. 3 ("Whatever the merits of (arguments against
mandatory pro bono], I would prefer to avoid the wasteful and divisive confrontation
that would seem inevitably to be precipitated by implementation of a mandatory plan.").
," See Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 19 ("The absence of legal assis-
tance to the poor goes to the essence of some fundamental principles ingrained in our
jurisprudence: simple equity, due process, equal protection, equal elementary access to
the judicial system to redress wrongs."); State Bar Plan, supra note 14, at 2 ("We believe
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the availability of legal services for the poor. 1 4 Both the
mandatory and voluntary plans relied in part on the existence of
a professional obligation for attorneys to serve the poor as set
forth in the Code of Professional Responsibility,145 and on the
lawyer's duty to aid in the administration of justice as an officer
of the court.146 The plans diverged on the extent of the obliga-
tion and duty.1 47
Changing the obligation from voluntary to mandatory in-
volves a shift in interpretation, from viewing the pro bono obli-
gation as an act of charity inspired by a sense of professionalism,
to viewing it as a professional duty owed to the public and the
courts to aid in the administration of justice: 8
[W]e believe that the voluntary/mandatory debate reflects a funda-
mental difference in professional outlook towards the lawyer's pro
bono obligation. Some proponents of voluntarism seem to regard law-
yers' public interest service as individual charity. In the context of the
legal services crisis, we see it as a professional duty.... This distinc-
tion is not merely philosophical, but has a practical effect in public
policy... [I]ts recognition as such is likely to result in the contribu-
tion of more legal services than a program understood and carried out
as charity, under which every contribution is a purely discretionary
act of kindness.49
The duty owed to the public to provide pro bono contribu-
tions emanates from the role lawyers have in our society as
"guardians of our lives, liberties and governing principles."1610
that lawyers accept the bar's fundamental role in assuring equal access to justice for all
people, regardless of their means.").
" Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 65 ("[T]he primary aim of [the Mar-
rero Committee Plan] was to improve the availability of legal services to the poor and
thereby also enhance the administration of justice."); State Bar Plan, supra note 14, at 3
("Our Committee chose, primarily, to focus on the challenge of addresing the unmet
legal needs of the poor . ").
" New York Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility EC 2-25, (1970, as
amended 1990).
'4 Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 27; State Bar Plan, supra note 14, at
2-3, 5-6.
14 Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 6-7. There is disagreement on the
extent of a lawyer's responsibility to help alleviate the problem. Id.
"1 Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 27-28, 32-33, 65, and 97.
19 Id. at 97 (emphasis in original).
150 Id. at 31. "[W]hat lawyers do is about providing justice .... Lawyers have a
special obligation to insure a legal system that protects the rights of individuals, and
their political, civil and religious freedoms .... Like no other professionals, lawy'ers are
charged with the responsibility for systemic improvement of not only their own profe3-
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With this duty comes responsibilities and privileges, including
the privilege of more self-regulation than most professions. 101 In
return, the public can demand that lawyers assume more of the
burden, within reason, of improving the legal system.1 18  The
duty to provide pro bono services which is expressed in our Code
of Professional Responsibility should be made an "enforceable
norm," in view of the desperate need for increased civil legal ser-
vices for the poor.15 The Marrero Committee Plan also relied on
the lawyer's duty to the court.1 54 A mandatory pro bono rule for
attorneys is part of a judicial solution to the crisis of the unmet
legal services needs of the poor.155 As a coequal branch of gov-
ernment, the judiciary has an obligation to maintain access to
the court system. In addition, courts have the power to regulate
the practice of law by all attorneys admitted to the bar.""' A
mandatory rule is justifiable as a condition imposed by the court
on the license to practice law.
157
Some proponents of a mandatory rule view lawyers as part-
ners with government.158 Government has delegated to lawyers
sion, but of the law and society itself." Id. at 31-32. See also Cardin & Rhudy, supra
note 55, at 12 n.63 (citing Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[AIll the interests of man that are comprised under the
constitutional guarantees given to 'life, liberty and property' are in the professional
keeping of lawyers.")).
"' Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 32.
152 Id.
Id. at 33.
14 Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 65-66:
We did not regard it to be the starting point of our task to effectuate the law-
yers' ethical obligation under the Code of Professional Responsibility to pro-
vide public interest service. As we view it, the legal profession's contribution to
the legal services shortage would be one component of a judicial solution to
relieve a crisis in our legal system and improve the administration of justice
.... Accordingly, the means by which the primary objective of improving the
availability of legal services is carried out should not be constrained by the
personal service standard that would pertain if the sole task at hand were ef-
fectuating the ethical principles set forth in the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility. Instead, the means by which the problem could be remedied could be
formulated within the bounds of what the court could reasonably require law-
yers to contribute pertinent to the need.
155 Id. at 65.
86 Id. at 153, 158-59 app. C (Constitutional and Statutory Issues). "(L)awyers ad-
mitted to practice in New York can be compelled to assist in the overall administration
of justice in the courts pursuant to standards set by the Court of Appeals under Judici-
ary Law section 53." Id. at 159.
1 Rosenfeld, supra note 45, at 279.
'" Millemann, supra note 44, at 32.
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the power and responsibility to enforce the law. Along with the
power, lawyers share with the government an obligation to en-
sure that laws are enforced equally. In exchange for the duty
and responsibility, lawyers receive a monopoly on access to the
legal system and the privilege of being in a largely self-regulated
profession.1 59 A duty to aid the poor to receive equal access to
the legal system is imposed fairly when society has not been able
to meet this need.
The Marrero Committee Plan treated the responsiblity to
provide assistance to the poor as resting on each individual at-
torney as well as on the legal profession as a whole. 10 However,
the Plan's stated goal was to improve access to the legal system
rather than to enforce an ethical obligation, or make better peo-
ple of attorneys. 61
CONCLUSION
To a large extent, poor people in New York State are forced
to cope with most of their civil legal problems without the bene-
fit of legal guidance or assistance. Increased government funding
for civil legal services is needed but has not been forthcoming.
To increase the availability of civil legal services for the poor, a
mandatory pro bono plan requiring forty hours of pro bono ser-
vice every two years by every attorney has been proposed by a
committee appointed by the Chief Judge of the Court of Ap-
peals. An alternate plan proposing a voluntary standard of the
same amount has been proposed by the NYSBA. The Chief
Judge has postponed adoption of a mandatory plan for two
years to allow time for the voluntary plan to succeed. If the vol-
untary plan does not result in an increase in pro bono contribu-
tions, a mandatory plan may still be promulgated. Both
mandatory and voluntary plans are premised on an obligation of
attorneys to aid the poor in obtaining legal services. For a volun-
tary plan to succeed, this sense of obligation must .be reinforced
in all attorneys. A mandatory plan is the straighter route to the
same goal. The Marrero Committee Plan contains enough flexi-
269 Id.
110 Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 28.
161 Id. But see Marrero Committee Plan, supra note 11, at 138-39 (statement by
Corbin) (duty to the poor is owed by society overall and the lawyer's obligation is a
purely personal one as a member of society).
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bility and choice to overcome the major arguments against a
mandatory pro bono plan. At the same time, the plan can
achieve a significant increase in legal representation for the
poor.
Cynthia R. Watkins
